Introduction
The federal election of 9 The Coalition's victory was even more remarkable given the Government, seeking its fourth term, was pitted against a reinvigorated ALP Opposition led by a youthful -and seemingly popular -leader. But this poll was unusual for other reasons. First, the six week campaign was the longest since 1984 and, second, not since 1966 has a government secured a net increase of seats at two successive elections. These circumstances prompt an obvious question: why did the ALP perform so poorly at this point in the electoral cycle and in the wake of its potentially damaging allegations as to the Coalition's integrity?
This article argues that four sets of factors were at play: first, the pre-campaign period in which the Coalition laid critical economic preparations and the ALP made significant policy blunders; second, electors' positive perceptions of John Howard's leadership and less favourable perceptions of Mark Latham's; third, the campaign agenda itself in which the Coalition paraded its credentials on management of the economy and, more specifically, on interest rates; and, fourth, the ALP's "late-target" strategy of delayed policy release. 
Pre-election

The Campaign
The tone of the campaign itself -one pitched to an economic agenda set from day one by the Coalition -was undoubtedly a major influence on the result. It is even more critical to note that the Coalition, at no point, lost control of the campaign agenda. Announc ing the election date at a press conference, Howard immediately confronted Labor's campaign declaration of a referendum on "trust" in government. Dangerously exposed on this issue following the Scrafton testimony, Howard neutralised Labor's strategy by defining "trust" in his own terms: rather than an issue of "truth-telling", Howard instead asked voters whom did they better trust to manage the national economy. In short, Howard cannily converted a potential negative into a resound ing positive. To this end, the Coalition ran a series of television advertisements that, in arguing interest rates would always be higher under a Labor government, 
Policy
A further significant factor in Labor's loss was the party's failure, on two levels, to find appropriate policy traction, even in areas the party traditionally dominates. On a general level, under its "late target" strategy in which core policies were released late in the campaign, the ALP failed to convincingly "sell" its policies as a comprehensive package. Designed to minimise the opportunity for Coalition scrutiny, the "late target" strategy instead encouraged Coalition criticism for an alleged lack of policy detail and, more critically, robbed swinging voters of much needed time to "digest" adequately Labor's offerings. A lack of cred ibility in the Labor program, and a loss of confidence in the party itself, was the inevitable result. Labor's forest policy proved equally unpalatable among voters, particularly in regional Australia, and especially in Tasmania. In pledging to end logging in that state's old growth forests, the party alienated blue-collar workers in "sunset industries" already marginalised by globalisation and the march of economic reform. Indeed, some evidence suggests that up to one-third of trade union members voted for the Coalition. Why Labor failed
